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Are Refugees Special?
Chandran Kukathas
The stranger has no friend, unless it be a stranger1
12.1 Prologue: The Morality of Hospitality
His vessel crushed by Poseidon’s storm after leaving Kalypso’s island, Odys-
seus ﬁnds himself washed up on the shores of Phaiakia and, eventually, the
guest of the hospitable King, Alkinoos, to whom he tells the long story of the
journey that led him from Troy to Ogygia. After reaching, and quickly leaving,
the land of the lotus-eaters, Odysseus relates, he and his crew came to the
“country of the lawless outrageous Cyclopes.” Of the inhabitants he had this
to say:
These people have no institutions, no meetings for counsels;
rather they make their habitations in caverns hollowed
among the peaks of the high mountains, and each one is the law
for his own wives and children, and cares nothing about the others.2
Yet when he found himself trapped in the cave of Polyphemus, he had no
choice but to address his suspicious host, who demanded to know what these
strangers were after, “recklessly roving as pirates do,” andwondered if they too
proposed to “venture their lives as they wander, bringing evil to alien
people?”3 Odysseus at once tried to reassure the son of Poseidon that he and
1 Sa’di, The Gulistan or Flower Garden, of Shaikh Sadı¯ of Shiraz, translated by James Ross (London:
J.M. Richardson, 1823 [1258]), p. 297.
2 Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, translated and with an introduction by Richmond Lattimore
(New York: Harper Collins, 1991), Book IX, verses 113–15: p. 140.
3 Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, Book IX, 254–5: pp. 143–4.
<i>Migration in Political Theory : The Ethics of Movement and Membership</i>, edited by Sarah Fine, and Lea Ypi, Oxford
         University Press USA - OSO, 2016. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=4842723.
Created from smu on 2019-10-14 20:03:08.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
6.
 O
xf
or
d 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 P
re
ss
 U
S
A
 -
 O
S
O
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
hismen intended no one any harm, and to remind him that, as strangers, they
might well be considered guests:
. . .but now in turn we come to you and are suppliants
at your knees, if you might give us a guest present or otherwise
some gift of grace, for such is the right of strangers. Therefore
respect the gods, O best of men. We are your suppliants,
and Zeus the guest god, who stands behind all strangers with honours
due them, avenges any wrong toward strangers and suppliants.4
The Cyclopes, of course, had no intention of showing the wanderers any
hospitality, proposing only to eat them.
That Polyphemus should come to the nasty end that he did at the hands of
the stranger, “Nobody,” is entirely in keeping with the understanding of civil-
ized life that lies at the core of Homer’s Odyssey. A vital part of being civilized is
knowing the duties of hospitality—and the duties owed to strangers in particu-
lar. The Cyclopes, the Lastrygonians, and Circe, among others, do not under-
stand these duties—and come to grief. The Phaiakians, however, are model
hosts, and their land is a civilized place where all is in order.
Indeed, when society is well ordered and in balance, norms of hospitality
are also in balance: respected by hosts and not abused by guests. Ithaca, the
Kingdom of Odysseus, however, is in a mess, the disorder of the state symbol-
ized by the overrunning of the household by Penelope’s suitors, who abuse
the hospitality of their reluctant hostess while demanding a decision which
will make one of them king. The task performed by the central ﬁgure of
Homer’s epic is to keep the household and the kingdom intact, preserving
the most important values of civilized life, until Odysseus can return to settle
the issue of succession.
Themoralworld of ancientGreece described inHomer’s poetry is undoubtedly
a long way away from our own. Yet there is something important, nonetheless,
about the idea that hospitality and the treatment of strangers is fundamental to
civilized life, and the key to the possibility of a well-ordered society. It does not
seem out of place in Sa’di’s thirteenth century Persia; or, for that matter, in our
own time. It seems right to say that we owe a duty of hospitality to strangers,
particularly when they come to us in distress: and we owe the most when they
can offer us the least. “For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty
and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in.”5
Intuitively compelling though this might be, however, the skeptical ques-
tionmust be posed: can such a norm serve us inmodern society?We live, after
all, in a world of many more people and many more strangers. Can a Homeric
4 Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, Book IX, 266–71: p. 144.
5 St. Matthew, Chapter 25 Verse 35.
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ethics really serve us when the size of the earth’s population, combined with
the number of dislocating conﬂicts and the volume of population displace-
ment, threaten to strain the resources and the tolerance of host peoples? As
Rousseau observed, “Wherever strangers are rare, they are welcome. Nothing
makes one more hospitable than seldom needing to be. It is the abundance of
guests which destroys hospitality. In the time of Homer people hardly trav-
eled, and travelers were well received everywhere.”6
It must be conceded that the skeptic may have a point: perhaps Homeric
ethics cannot be ours. Yet the ethical and political point of Homer’s tale ought
not to be lost either. The norms of civilized society are importantly bound up
with the treatment of strangers. Our conduct before, and treatment of, those
we do not immediately count among our own has an important relation to,
and bearing upon, the quality of our civilization. And this reﬂection ought not
to be lost sight of when we turn to consider what kind of an ethics we do need
to deal with the strangers of the modern world, particularly when they appear
before us in large numbers, ﬂeeing persecution or tragedy and seeking refuge
in places they hope will prove hospitable. What kind of an ethics do we need
to deal with those so displaced—the strangers who come as refugees?
The answer we have settled upon is a political ethics according to which the
movement of peoples is a matter for states to manage, with a view to protect-
ing the interests of the state and its members, while granting special dispen-
sation on humanitarian grounds to those whose reasons for moving are
deemed special. The question addressed in this chapter is whether or not
this political ethics is defensible—whether the idea of a system in which
movement is controlled (and more importantly, restricted) but exceptions are
made is either feasible or morally justiﬁable. Its main purpose is to cast doubt
on this idea by showing that it depends upon distinctions that cannot be
sustained and upon the establishment of institutions that cannot do what
they proclaim. It does so by focusing on the case of refugees, who are widely
regarded by states, political actors generally, immigration advocates, and
theorists alike as deserving of special treatment.
12.2 Refugees as Exceptions
Modern reﬂection on the ethics of our relations with strangers begins with the
existence of a world of states, and of individuals as members of states (with
the notable exception of a small but signiﬁcant minority who remain state-
less). The world today is demarcated by political boundaries and so borders
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, Introduction, translation and Notes by Allan
Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), ch. V: p. 413.
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that are increasingly closely policed. While there is movement across borders
all the time, that movement is almost always complicated. To move one has
generally to acquire a passport and secure a status, whether as a tourist, or a
student, or a worker, or any one of dozens of possible types of person who is
eligible to be granted entry into a state. Though some borders are easier to
cross than others—or at least, easier for some people to cross—the presump-
tion in the modern world is that “thou shall not cross” without proper
authorization. Only a few borders come close to being absolutely shut, but
none are fully open. The purpose of borders is to keep people out: to deny
them membership of the state, or to limit their rights when they do enter, or
to bar them from physical entry altogether. The ethical issue at stake is the
matter of how closed or open those borders should be: who should be allowed
in and who kept out? Whatever the preponderance of opinion among philo-
sophers, the view of the state is generally that people should be kept out unless
it is to the advantage (or at least, not to the disadvantage) of the state that they
be admitted. No one has a right to be admitted, and the principle of free
movement, if it holds at all, applies only within states, and not between states.
Nevertheless, all but the most insistent of defenders of closed borders or
restricted immigration make an exception for refugees. However strong they
consider the reasons for limiting the numbers, or controlling the types, of
immigrants—strangers—entering a country, they concede that refugees are a
special case. Michael Walzer, for example, maintains that a people’s right to
control membership of the state to which they belong must nonetheless be
sensitive to the plight of refugees.7 David Miller similarly argues, after making
the case for immigration limits, that refugees “have a very strong, but not
absolute, right to be admitted to a place of safety, a right now widely recog-
nized in both law and political practice.”8 This is not to say that either of these
theorists thinks that the claims of refugees are so great as to trump the interests
of states or citizens. In the end, their views are not far from that advanced by
Andrew Altman and ChristopherWellman, who argue that while states have a
general “samaritan duty” to help people who land on their doorstep seeking
asylum, this does not extend so far as to constitute an obligation to grant them
admission or membership.9 Nonetheless, these authors also concede that the
duty to “help rescue from peril,”when it can only be discharged by admission
to membership of the state, would issue in a duty to admit asylum seekers,
7 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983),
pp. 43–51.
8 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
p. 227. See also David Miller, “Immigration: The Case for Limits” in Andrew I. Cohen and
Christopher Heath Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell,
2005), pp. 193–206 at pp. 202–3.
9 Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 181.
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even though they think this duty holds “only if nothing was done to remedy
the situation in the home state and no other state was willing to grant
permanent residence.”10
The thought that lies behind these views is that there is a very strong
presumption in favor of a state having the right to, and being justiﬁed in,
limiting entry into its territory. States may wish to restrict immigration for any
of a number of reasons: to protect their citizens from criminals or subversives,
to give some of their citizens an advantage in labor-market or business
competition—or more generally to ensure it does not share too much of its
wealth with outsiders, and to protect its cultural integrity. States are justiﬁed
in doing so even if the costs to foreigners—would-be immigrants and non-
immigrants alike (and indeed citizens who would stand to gain from immi-
gration)—are substantial. (Thus no state thought it was under any obligation
to open its borders even a little to the Haitians whose country was devastated
by the 2010 earthquake that killed at least 46,000, injured more than 200,000,
and left 1.5 million homeless.11 Many stepped up with generous offers of aid,
in cash and in kind, but also strengthened their border surveillance to keep
ﬂeeing Haitians out.) Yet, the thought continues, states ought to bemore open
to some kinds of people: those ﬂeeing persecution, fearing for their lives.
Confronted by such cases, the argument goes, states ought to relax the pre-
sumption in favor of keeping people out when the beneﬁts of admitting them
are outweighed by the costs—or at least engage in some form of recalculation
that weighs the interests of the potential immigrants a little more heavily.
People seeking asylum are special—not so special, perhaps, as to be regarded
simply as ends in themselves, but special enough to be viewed as more
substantial concerns in the calculus of value than immigrants of any other
stripe. Theorists such as Walzer, Miller, Altman, and Wellman think that
exceptions have to be made for special categories (and possibly for special
circumstances), but the presumption in favor of states controlling movement
remains.
Of course, there are many other things that could be done besides admitting
asylum seekers into the state. The samaritan’s duty might embrace any of a
variety of possibilities, as Altman and Wellman maintain. The general duty is
to rescue people from peril, and this duty can be discharged in any number of
ways. It could be discharged by “sending the asylum-seekers to another state
that has agreed to let them in; by establishing through military intervention a
safe-haven in the asylum-seekers’ home state and returning them there; by
10 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p. 181. The buck lingers here.
11 These are the more conservative ﬁgures from the U.S. Agency for International Development,
rather than the ofﬁcial numbers published by the Haitian government. According to the Human
Development Index, Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas, with an annual per capita
income of a little over US$600 a year.
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letting them in and granting them asylum until such time as they can be safely
settled in another state or their home state.” Only when all else fails does the
duty to admit asylum seekers kick in. But these people are special—for in the
case of refugees such a duty can eventually arise in a way that it cannot with
respect to other aspiring immigrants.
Yet all this said, there is something troubling about the thought that refu-
gees are special, and that there are certain distinctive features of their situation
that impose upon us duties we do not owe others. It is troubling, ﬁrst, because
it suggests that we draw a line distinguishing our obligations in a way thatmay
not make much sense, morally speaking. Second, the institutional implica-
tions of this way of approaching the plight of asylum seekers are unfortunate
for it proposes that we treat them as supplicants whomust prove their worthi-
ness, thereby opening up the way for matters of humanitarian necessity to be
transformed into questions of political expediency. More generally, the very
idea that duties towards refugees might be special duties owed by the state is
troubling because, if we understand the state properly, it is hard to see how
refugees will ever be given proper moral consideration. After all, the category
of refugee was created by states not so much to enable us to fulﬁll our duties to
the distressed and unfortunate as to make it easier for us to evade them.
If this is true, then those who argue that the existing arrangements under
which states are widely seen to be justiﬁed in limiting the free movement of
people, while having obligations only to make exceptions for special categor-
ies of person, should just give up the ﬁction that the plight of refugees is a
serious ethical concern. It would be more accurate and honest to concede
that it is simply a matter of indifference, for, ultimately, strangers just don’t
count—no matter what their predicament.
To see this we should begin by lookingmore closely at theway the distinction
between refugees and other potential migrants is drawn, to try to understand
how the case for differential duties might be made—and why it cannot be
sustained. We should turn then to consider why institutionalizing this distinc-
tion is unlikely to achieve the ethical ends that are supposed to be the point of
this development. The historical record provides ample evidence to bear this
out. From here we can turn to consider more directly the reasons why making
the state the bearer of ethical duties is not likely to serve the interests of the
refugees or asylum seekers to any signiﬁcant degree, and is more likely to harm
those interests. Out of this analysis comes just one conclusion that seems
plausible: the interests of refugees and asylum seekers can only be served by
an opening of state borders. To the extent that this prospect is utopian, so too is
the prospect of humane treatment of those almost everyone says is special.12
12 For some reﬂections on how the attempt to reform the institutions of refugee protection may
itself be utopian, see William Maley, “A New Tower of Babel? Reappraising the Architecture of
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12.3 Refugees versus Immigrants
To see the problem with making a moral distinction between refugees and
immigrants, it would be useful to start with the deﬁnition of refugee deployed
by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which
came into force in 1954 and now has more than 120 state signatories. The
Convention states that a refugee is any person who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Article 1A2)
What is most glaring about this deﬁnition is who it excludes: those ﬂeeing
their circumstances for reasons other than persecution; those who have ﬂed
but not crossed an international boundary; and those whose ﬂight from
persecution has taken them across borders but who have been persecuted for
reasons other than race, religion, nationality, or social or political member-
ship. Most Cambodians trying to escape from the Khmer Rouge did not count
as refugees.
The matter of deﬁnition has been a contentious issue from the start and
there have been many proposals to revise the Convention’s understanding to
try to include more people who seem also to be candidates for refugee status:
people ﬂeeing war, or famine, or environmental disaster, to name some
obvious cases. Thus the Organization of African Unity adopted a very different
deﬁnition, according to which a refugee was a person who “owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality,
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of nationality” (OAU Convention Govern-
ing the Speciﬁc Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted September 10,
1969 (UNTS no.14691), Article 1(2)).13 Bosnians ﬂeeing civil war are thus
captured by this deﬁnition in a way that they are not by the 1951 UN
Convention. Yet even this deﬁnition has its limitations, since it excludes
internally displaced people, and a better account may be the one offered by
Matthew Gibney, who suggests that refugees are “those people who require a
Refugee Protection” in Edward Newman and Joanne van Selm (eds.), Refugees and Forced
Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State (Tokyo: United Nations
Press, 2003), pp. 306–29.
13 See the discussion in Andrew Shacknove, “Who is a Refugee?,” Ethics 95:2 (1985), 274–84 at
pp. 275–6.
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new state of residence, either temporarily or permanently, because if forced to
return or stay at home they would, as a result of either the inadequacy or
brutality of their state, be persecuted or seriously jeopardize their physical
security or vital subsistence needs.”14 One particular merit of this deﬁnition is
that it also includes as refugees those forced to ﬂee in anticipation of rightly
foreseeable repression. It also includes refugees sur place: persons whowere not
refugees when they left their countries, but are unable to return home because
events in their country since their original temporary departure have left them
with a well-founded fear of persecution should they do so.
The problem, however, is not the quality of the deﬁnition but the pursuit of
the distinction that gives the deﬁnition its point. The purpose of distinguish-
ing between refugees and immigrants is to limit and control the movement of
people in a world in which free movement is not tolerated. If only some are
allowed to move, the question is: who? States allow people to move in and out
for a variety of reasons, most of them economic or political. Economic con-
siderationsmay include the need tomeet the domestic demand for labor (both
skilled and unskilled), the desire to attract foreign investment capital, and the
concern to change the demographic structure of the population. The import-
ance of such economic concerns makes states less likely to welcome the poor,
the illiterate, the disabled, the unskilled, the unhealthy, and the elderly.15
Political considerations lie behind the weight given to different economic
concerns. Business interests generally favor more immigration since capital
beneﬁts when there is a larger pool of labor; while labor fears that immigrants
will either outcompete domestic workers or depress the general level of wages
by entering the labor market. Immigration policy will always attempt to
placate these two contending economic interests. But other political consid-
erations will also obtrude. Different groups will want preferential treatment
for particular classes of migrant: universities will want favorable treatment for
students, families with relatives overseas will want to privilege family reunion,
ethnic communities will want their own national or cultural groups given
special treatment if immigrant places are limited, and lovers will want excep-
tions made for potential marriage partners. In a world of controlled borders,
refugees must either compete with other immigrants for a limited number of
places or show that the case for their admission should not be considered as a
14 Matthew Gibney, “Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities for Refugees,” American
Political Science Review 93:1 (1999), 169–81 at pp. 170–1. See also Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and
Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
15 A quick glance at the “points tests” administered by the Australian and Canadian
governments to would-be immigrants makes the nature of the calculus very plain: there are more
points to be gained for having greater language proﬁciency, more years of study, a sum ofmoney to
transfer, and a longer life expectancy as a potential future tax-payer. Ill health and any criminal
record cancel out the points gained by having some of the other desirable assets.
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part of the general case for immigrant admission: that they really are special.
But how is this to be done?
It may look as though the best strategy here is simply to insist that the
refugee question is a humanitarian issue, and that refugees should not be
viewed as economic migrants but people whose human rights have been
violated and need to be restored. Thus Yael Tamir suggests that “a clear
distinction should be drawn between the rights of refugees and the rights of
immigrants. Although certain restrictions on immigrants could be justiﬁed,
they could never rescind the absolute obligation to grant refuge to individuals
for as long as their lives are at risk.”16 This is an argument many refugee
advocates have decided to make, in part for fear that if refugees were viewed
as migrants they would be easy prey for governments looking to reduce
immigration numbers.17 But this strategy is sustainable only if such a distinc-
tion can really be drawn.18 Unfortunately, this looks very unlikely.
One way of drawing the distinction might be to follow Tamir and say that
there is an absolute obligation to grant refuge to individuals whose lives are at
risk. Yet there are many difﬁculties with this approach. To begin with, even if
we put to one side the question of whether this, or any other, obligation can
be “absolute,” the problem is that human circumstances are never absolute
but relative. Lives may be at risk, but all lives are never equally at risk, and the
degree of risk that is a cause for alarm is a matter of moral judgment. It may
have been riskier to be a Jew in pre-war Berlin than to be a Hazara in Afghani-
stan today, but it is probably riskier to be a Hazara in Kabul than to be a
Reformasi activist in Malaysia. The risks borne by those whose lives are at risk
also vary, since some face the prospect of being killed, others face possible
imprisonment, and some the loss of economic, civil, and political rights. Lives
can be at risk inmanyways and to varying degrees. It would not be plausible to
argue that any level of risk triggers a right to be granted refuge; but there is no
naturalistic way of determining what level of risk might.
Assuming, however, that the principle of granting refuge to those whose
lives are at risk can be given some substantive content, it would have to be
shown why this should favor those seeking asylum rather than those moving
for reasons other than ﬂight from persecution. Many economicmigrants, after
all, move because their lives, or the lives of their loved ones, are at risk. Adverse
economic conditions, environmental catastrophe, or simply the poverty of
their surrounding circumstances may mean that they face destitution unless
they move, for their plight cannot be addressed by domestic institutions or
16 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 159.
17 See the discussion in Liza Schuster, The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany
(London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 33–4.
18 Though I don’t want to get carried away here: in politics, truth can all too often be readily
overcome by interest or power.
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the help of fellow citizens. There are many refugees whose plight is more
serious than that of most economic migrants; yet there are also many
would-be economic migrants who face greater threats to their well-being
than do some refugees. Not all economic migrants are in the same boat; nor
are all refugees.
At this point the problem of deﬁnition becomes particularly acute. We
could try to bolster the claim that the plight of the refugee is more serious
than that of the economic migrant by narrowing the deﬁnition of refugee—
perhaps appealing to a conservative reading of the 1951 Convention so that
only those outside their home countries fearing persecution for very particular
reasons might qualify. The trouble here is that refugee protection is bought at
a high price: excluding, for example, those ﬂeeing war zones or famine or even
genocidal violence from being considered refugees. The more narrowly the
term is deﬁned the easier it might be to make refugees special, but only
because there would be many fewer of them. However, if we consider this
unpalatable, and think the deﬁnition should be expanded to include a greater
number of types of displaced people, the difference between refugees and
economic migrants will be even harder to draw.
Any attempt to show empirically that refugees, or displaced people more
generally, suffer in ways that economic migrants do not, will founder on the
rocks of this particular dilemma. The root of the problem is that the source of
injustice, or of human suffering, is not always easy to locate. The aspiration to
ﬁnd the explanation that distinguishes the refugee from the human being
whomoves merely (merely!) to improve his lot is in many cases motivated by a
noble concern to address the needs of those who are most vulnerable or suffer
most. But, for better or for worse, suffering is dispersed too erratically for our
political concepts to handle.
12.4 Institutional Solutions
One possible response to this analysis is to say that it will not do to get too
caught up in conceptual niceties, for it is well known that in political life
philosophical purity is not really attainable. The tragic reality of the plight of
refugees, asylum seekers, or displaced peoplemore generally, cannot be denied:
the evidence is overwhelming. Even if we cannot quite account for it concep-
tually, the swarms of people moving in response to the predations of genocidal
rulers, or rushing across borders to avoid bombs and marauding armies, supply
evidence enough of a distinct phenomenon.What is needed is an institutional
response that recognizes that there is a problem that must be addressed.
The institutional response we have made is that embodied in the regime
deﬁned by the 1951 Convention. However imperfectly, the argument goes, it
Chandran Kukathas
258
<i>Migration in Political Theory : The Ethics of Movement and Membership</i>, edited by Sarah Fine, and Lea Ypi, Oxford
         University Press USA - OSO, 2016. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=4842723.
Created from smu on 2019-10-14 20:03:08.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
6.
 O
xf
or
d 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 P
re
ss
 U
S
A
 -
 O
S
O
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
rightly draws the distinction between refugees and immigrants. Our best bet
might be simply to try to work within its terms in an effort to secure what we
can for the victims of repressive states and war.19 A regime of human rights
that recognizes the rights of refugees might lack the full theoretical justiﬁca-
tion philosophers seek, but it could just work—by giving refugees the legal and
moral resources they need to protect or secure their vital interests.
Unfortunately, this simply won’t do. International regimes, to be sure, are
political constructions rather than philosophical ones; but this is not to the
advantage of the refugee or asylum seeker. On the contrary, what is all too
evident is that the purpose of the institutional identiﬁcation of refugees in
international law was never solely to attend to the plight of the distressed and
dispossessed but largely to serve the interests of states.
The 1951 UN Convention on Refugees has its origins in the Second World
War, which saw hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the conﬂict,
many of them victims and survivors of the Holocaust. Britain became home to
many of these people, primarily from Eastern Europe, who were unable to
return to their countries of origin. The government labeled them “displaced
persons” rather than refugees, since they thought the term refugee might
imply that the persons in question would not return to their home coun-
tries.20 In 1947 the International Refugee Organization was formed and its
deﬁnition of displaced persons as victims of Nazi, fascist, or quisling regimes
or “persons who were considered refugees before the outbreak of the Second
WorldWar, for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion” later
formed the basis of the 1951 Convention understanding of refugees as per-
sons ﬂeeing persecution. But already the British and American governments
were hesitant about using the term “refugee” for fear that it might amount to
a concession that the persons in question could not return. Many people
were thus allowed to stay in Britain, for example, as “European Volunteer
Workers,” who were supposedly admitted to help alleviate labor shortages.21
At the very outset, even with the memory of the Holocaust fresh in the mind,
the thoughts of government ofﬁcials turned to the problem of how to keep
people out.
On the whole, the history of the state’s treatment of refugees is not an
inspiring one. In the years between the wars the nations of Europe were
more troubled by the inconvenience of refugee movements and invented
new mechanisms to restrict their mobility. The outﬂow of Jewish refugees
from Nazi Germany in the 1930s was met with grim resistance by states that
19 For further discussion of statelessness and refugees, see the chapters by Joseph Carens and
David Owen in this volume.
20 Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, Local, and National
Perspectives during the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 217.
21 Kushner and Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide, p. 218.
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expressed support for the principle of granting asylum but refused to grant
refugees rights to any such thing. Twentieth-century states, it turned out,
“were governed by Machiavellian self-interest, and liberalism served only to
disguise this brutal reality.”22
The workings of the refugee regime since the establishment of the 1951
Convention can scarcely be said to have served the interests of refugees well.
Some of this is best explained by the particular interests of states, which have
continued to see refugees as a problem whose impact has to be minimized
rather than a moral responsibility to be discharged. Thus while the number of
conventional instruments devised for the purpose of refugee protection has
increased, the commitment of states to that end has, if anything, declined.
The upsurge in the numbers of refugees worldwide as a result of the many
political conﬂicts in the postwar era led to states increasingly adopting meas-
ures to restrict opportunities to seek asylum. Agnès Hurwitz identiﬁes ﬁve
kinds of policies used to achieve this end. First, there are measures to restrict
access to the territory of the state by imposing ﬁnes on companies transport-
ing undocumented aliens, by requiring visas from nationals of refugee produ-
cing countries, by posting immigration ofﬁcers abroad, and by interdicting
vessels at sea to prevent them from allowing refugee passengers to make
landfall. Second, there are measures to limit access to asylum procedures, for
example by imposing strict time limits for the lodging of asylum claims,
invoking the concept of “safe country of origin” to require that claims for
refugee status be processed elsewhere, and creating international zones in
airports. Third, states have adopted a narrower interpretation of Article 1 of
the Refugee Convention, and invented weaker forms of protection, such as
temporary or subsidiary protection. Fourth, states have tried to create “safe
havens” in the regions or countries of the refugee’s origin in order to discour-
age or prevent attempts to seek asylum. Fifth, states have restricted access to
welfare beneﬁts and placed refugees in detention in order to deter arrivals.23
In pursuing these strategies states have effectively blurred the distinction
between refugees and economic migrants by treating all asylum seekers with
suspicion. Even as they have maintained the centrality of the distinction
between refugees and migrants to their policies, they have weakened it by
treating asylum seekers as undocumented would-be immigrants unless they
can show otherwise—while making it ever more difﬁcult for refugee claims to
be established. When immigration ofﬁcers have gone to refugee camps they
have often gone with the aim of picking and choosing the most economically
22 Schuster, Use and Abuse of Political Asylum, p. 89.
23 Agnès Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 18–19.
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attractive potential migrants—doctors and engineers rather than women and
children traumatized by war or violence.
What has emerged over the years, in what is supposed to be a refugee
protection regime, is a security-driven discourse that has led to the adoption
of greater and greater measures designed to “contain” the refugee problem by
restricting the opportunities of asylum seekers to gain refugee status and,
ultimately, admission to the state.
Of the practices used to delay, if not prevent altogether, the possibility of
asylum seekers or refugees gaining admission, two are worth dwelling upon a
little more carefully. The ﬁrst is the conﬁning or detaining of asylum seekers
waiting to learn if they will be brought to a more permanent place of safety or
waiting to learn if their application for refugee status has been successful. The
enforcement of immigration controls generally has led to the development of
an extensive system of prisons to deal with undocumented workers, visa over-
stayers, and illegal aliens of all kinds.24 For many victims of forced displace-
ment, the search for asylum begins in refugee camps where they exist on the
edge of the social world in conditions which are often little better than prison.
What is too seldom recognized or acknowledged is that refugee camps have
become, in effect, one of the four solutions to the refugee problem adopted by
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. The ﬁrst three, ofﬁcial,
solutions are: repatriation, integration in the country of asylum, and resettle-
ment in a third country. In 2007 UNHCR reported that there were some
6.5 million people residing in refugee camps around the world (not including
camps of Palestinian refugees, or those for internally displaced people in
places like Sudan). Under the refugee regime, vast numbers of people live in
makeshift accommodation, often in remote and inhospitable parts of the
world, with plastic sheeting for extra coverings, and food that is rationed by
agencies which have themselves to go begging to raise the funds to feed
people who have ﬂed for their lives. The camps are not a happy advertisement
for the success of the institutionalization of refugee protection.
Yet this barely begins to get at the nature of the problem with the institu-
tional response to the plight of the refugee or asylum seeker. Regardless of the
conditions in the camps,25 the people looking for help ﬁnd themselves not at
24 For graphic accounts of what this means in practice, see David C. Brotherton and Philip
Kretsedemas (eds.), Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
25 A part of the tragedy of many of the camps is the fact of abuse of the people herded into them
for protection by the very people designated as their humanitarian protectors. Discussing the
sexual abuses perpetrated in camps in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, Michel Agier and
Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier observed: “Designed to bring help and protection to people in
danger, in some cases humanitarian action has contributed to enclosing people in spaces of
exception, spaces of irresponsibility. Far from protecting the international public order, the
continued existence of these spaces has reintroduced inhumanity at the heart of all societies.”
See their chapter, “Humanitarian Spaces, Spaces of Exception” in Fabrice Weissman (ed.), In the
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the doorstep of agencies straining to help them but of a vast and impersonal
bureaucratic structure that demands that they show—prove—that they have a
case. Asylum seekers confront this problem no matter what their circum-
stances, and regardless of the physical or emotional state they are in. To
some extent this is inescapable: bureaucratic procedures, once in place, cannot
simply be waived away because some people claim that they are inappropriate
or unreasonable or do not apply to them. But the human cost is worth
dwelling upon. Consider the case of France, one of the countries most active
in the negotiations surrounding the establishment of the 1951 Convention
(but also the toughest of the early signatories since it always viewed asylum
seekers as potential competitors in the French labor market). When France
began to place stronger restrictions on immigration in 1974, its policy on
asylum seekers became stricter and stricter as the imperative to stop the ﬂow
became increasingly urgent. Over the period of the seventies, eighties, and
nineties the percentage of refugee applications granted fell from a peak of
95 percent in 1976 to 28 percent in 1989, until by 2003 only three applicants
in twenty were successful.26 Crucially, however, those who were eventually
granted leave to remain in the country as bona ﬁde refugees had ﬁrst
to undergo searching examinations of their histories by border agents
who were also under pressure to reduce the credibility of the applicants’
testimonies.
Over the years the legal and bureaucratic obstacles to presenting a case for
asylum have increased and applicants have been turned into objects of suspi-
cion, dehumanized not only by their subjection to a bewildering array of
scrutinizing procedures but by the reduction of their life histories to a series
of objective statements on certiﬁcates that will be used to determine whether
or not the candidate merits selection. The subjective experience of the refugee
is played down, discarded, or never inquired into as the emphasis is placed on
whether clinical evidence is available to corroborate claims of torture or abuse
that led to ﬂight and escape. The following extract from a letter from the ﬁle
of legal correspondence collated by the nongovernmental organization
COMEDE supplies a striking illustration.
Dear Sir,
I write in respect of the Commission of Appeal hearing on [date]. In order for you
to obtain refugee status, you must send me a medical certiﬁcate testifying to the
Shadow of “Just Wars”: Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action, quoted in Didier Fassin, “Heart of
Humaneness: The Moral Economy of Humanitarian Intervention” in Didier Fassin and Mariella
Pandolﬁ (eds.), Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian
Interventions (New York: Zone Books, 2010), pp. 269–93 at p. 292, n.52.
26 Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of
Victimhood (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 256.
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traces left on your body as a result of the torture and abuse inﬂicted on you,
particularly with respect to your eye. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you
have any difﬁculty.
Yours sincerely . . . 27
The dehumanizing character of the institutional apparatus that has grown up
around the world to address the refugee “problem” is further evident in the
conditions under which those seeking asylum are detained in those countries
that incarcerate applicants until their cases are settled. In Australia the inmates
of the detention centers have been driven to suicide, self-mutilation, and even
to the extreme of sewing up their lips to express their sense of powerlessness.28
Institutionalizing the distinction between immigrant and refugee has been
considered by some to be the best, or only, way of promoting the interests of
asylum seekers and ensuring that their special claims were appropriately
considered. The reality, however, is that the institutional distinction has
accomplished no such thing. Governments have consistently seen refugees
as competitor economic migrants and have therefore constantly implied that
those seeking admission to a country on humanitarian grounds were nothing
more than queue-jumpers trying to get around the immigration laws. As time
has gone on, the institutional structures they have devised have simply made
it more andmore difﬁcult for asylum seekers to bring their claims forward, and
to gain the protection they seek. Institutionally, refugees have turned out not
to be very special at all.
12.5 In Search of a Solution
Refugees have been identiﬁed as special for a very special reason. Nation-states
and their defenders wish to maintain that immigration can rightly be
restricted to the extent that the state is an ethical community that requires
protection, and freedom of movement threatens to undermine it.29 Yet the
arbitrariness of such an arrangement is difﬁcult to ignore since the opportun-
ities people enjoy to live reasonably prosperous lives in safety differ so dra-
matically from one part of the world to the next—particularly when some
27 Quoted in Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2011), p. 114.
28 See Kathy Marks, “Refugee Camp Children Sew Their Lips in Protest,” The Independent,
January 22, 2002, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/refugee-camp-children-
sew-their-lips-in-protest-664504.html>.
29 For a passionate analysis of the transformative effects of immigration, and its costs and
dangers, see Paul Scheffer, Immigrant Nations, translated by Liz Waters (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2011). For an even more passionate critique of immigration from an American perspective (albeit
by an English immigrant to the United States), see Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense
about America’s Immigration Disaster (New York: Harper, 1996).
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people are effectively denied the freedom to improve their conditions by
moving to places where they might improve their lot. The birthright lottery
might be a fact of life, but it is difﬁcult to justify.30 For this reason, liberal
political theorists in particular have argued for a solution that combines
limiting immigration but compensating for the restriction on free movement
by greater transfers of wealth to the poor in other nations. There is a “tragic
conﬂict” between the goal of nation-building on the one hand and the liberal
commitment to equality on the other. But perhaps the tragedy can be avoided
by careful, constructive planning, to transfer wealth from the rich to the poor
abroad through appropriately devised global institutions.31 As Robert Goodin
puts it, “if rich countries do not want to let foreigners in, then the very least
they must do is send much more money to compensate them for their being
kept out.”32 Theorists such as Will Kymlicka, Thomas Pogge, and Martha
Nussbaum, in different ways, advocate a transformation of global institutions,
and the development of mechanisms of global redistribution, to combine
nation-building with a concern for global equality.33 The problem with refu-
gees is that transfers of wealth cannot help those whose suffering is rooted in
the breakdown of the institutions in their homelands, or the unwillingness of
the powers that dominate those institutions to accept them as members of
good standing. In such circumstances, it looks like an exception has to be
made for this class of people, who can best be helped not by a transfer of funds
but by emigration. The answer, it seems, is to allow some people tomovemore
easily as asylum seekers or refugees rather than migrants, and to develop
institutions that facilitate this.
As we have seen, however, there are two problems with this solution. First,
the distinction between immigrants and asylum seekers or refugees cannot
easily be drawn; and second, the history of the development of an institu-
tional framework to deal with the plight of refugees does not suggest that it
is even remotely possible to do justice to the people in question. Making
30 See Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2009).
31 For a discussion of the idea of such a dilemma, see Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders:
Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
pp. 123–32.
32 Robert E. Goodin, “If People Were Money . . . ” in Brian Barry and Robert Goodin (eds.), Free
Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and Money (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 6–22 at p. 9. Goodin is, however, an advocate of
open borders. See Goodin, “What’s so Special about our Fellow Countrymen?,” Ethics 99:4 (1989),
663–86.
33 See Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell,
2004); Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Oxford: Polity, 2002); Martha Nussbaum,
Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2011).
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refugees special neither makes sense conceptually, nor looks possible practic-
ally on the evidence we have to date.
If this is right, and there is indeed a trade-off between the ideals of nation-
building and the humane treatment of the displaced people of the world, then
we must either give up some of our concern with nation-building or simply
admit that we are prepared to leave a great number of vulnerable people to
their fate. If the fate of the wretched of the world is something we cannot
ignore, however, then this means, more concretely, that we should open
borders to immigrants of all kinds, thus removing the barriers to the free
movement of asylum seekers and other kinds of immigrants alike. Trying to
make ﬁne-grained judgments about which kinds of distress merit concern is
conceptually problematic; and trying to put these distinctions to work insti-
tutionally is more or less pointless. At best, this approach serves to do little
more than assuage some consciences that something is being done. But it
would be more honest simply to plead indifference.
This is not to suggest that we should simply throw our hands up in the air,
and wait for the advent of a borderless world to solve the problem. Border
controls are a reality, as is the existence of a refugee regime shaped by the
1951 Convention. Undoubtedly some good can be done by revising the
Convention, pressing for more generous interpretations of its rules, persuad-
ing state authorities to make it easier for asylum seekers to gain the right to
work, improving the conditions in detention centers (if authorities are
unwilling to close them down altogether). We must, after all, be realistic,
as we are repeatedly told we must. Yet we can do all this without buying into
the ﬁction that we can readily draw the distinction between refugees and
all other migrants, or that once such a distinction is made we can devise
and run institutions that will serve the interests of the desperate and the
destitute.
12.6 Epilogue: The Morality of Hospitality
Modern democratic societies host many people whose status in society is
uncertain, asylum seekers, refugees, and undocumented migrants among
them. In her study of the treatment of aliens in the democratic state, Seyla
Benhabib observes that such people are effectively treated as criminals by
existing polities. “The right to universal hospitality is sacriﬁced on the altar
of state interest.”34 She goes on to suggest that we
34 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), p. 177.
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. . .need to decriminalize the worldwide movement of peoples, and treat each
person, whatever his or her political citizenship status, in accordance with the
dignity of moral personhood. This implies acknowledging that crossing borders
and seeking entry into different polities is not a criminal act but an expression of
human freedom and the search for human betterment in a world which we have
to share with our fellow human beings.35
Benhabib develops the argument that leads to this view through an analysis of
Kant’s understanding of the universal right of hospitality enjoyed by all
peoples of the world. For all its humanity, however, Benhabib ﬁnds Kant’s
perspective wanting. While it recognizes an imperfect duty to help and offer
shelter to those in danger of life and limb, and is generally sympathetic to the
rights of all people to travel and sojourn in different lands, the structure that
has emerged that enshrines Kant’s thinking to some degree nonetheless views
matters from the perspective of the state, rather than of world society.While it
may not be possible to have a world of open borders, a case can be made for
more porous ones. We can build on Kant’s appreciation of the importance of
hospitality, but not become trapped by sharp distinctions between citizens
and aliens, members and foreigners. The aim should be to develop improved
understandings of membership and citizenship which take seriously the need
to incorporate those who move into the democratic polity—even if they
cannot be granted the full range of citizen rights on ﬁrst entry.
While I am very sympathetic to Benhabib’s stance, and recognize her
awareness of the tension between the demands of democratic representation
on the one hand and the requirements of open admission on the other, I am
not sure that a solution can be found that does not require a serious dimin-
ution in the importance of the state, and of membership of states. The
problem is that states, while not merely reﬂections of the relations of power
and the strength of particular interests in society, are nonetheless substan-
tially precisely that. To the extent that individuals engage with any society for
the ﬁrst time through a confrontation with the state, they are unlikely to be
met with hospitality rather than hostility. The very point of the state is to
protect interests; the problem is how to widen its purview so that it serves the
interest of all its members rather than the interests of those who can capture it.
To turn the state into an institution that takes seriously the interests of those
who are not even members might be more difﬁcult still.
If refugees and asylum seekers are to be welcomed into any society, and
shown a measure of hospitality, this will not be because the polity is welcom-
ing but because society is so. Hospitality is, as Homer shows us in the Odyssey,
a human relation rather than an institutional one. To the extent that we try to
35 Benhabib, The Rights of Others, p. 177.
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design institutions that perform a function that only people can, it seems
unlikely that our efforts will meet with much success.36
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